Underinvestment, capital structure and strategic debt restructuring by Pawlina, G
Underinvestment, Capital Structure and Strategic Debt
Restructuring
Grzegorz Pawlina∗
Department of Accounting and Finance, Lancaster University Management School, LA1 4YX, UK
Abstract
This paper shows that shareholders’ option to renegotiate debt in a period of financial
distress exacerbates Myers’ (1977) underinvestment problem at the time of the firm’s expan-
sion. This result is a consequence of a higher wealth transfer from shareholders to creditors
occurring upon investment in the presence of the option to renegotiate. This additional
underinvestment is eliminated by granting creditors the entire bargaining power. In such a
case, renegotiation commences at shareholders’ bankruptcy trigger so no additional wealth
transfer occurs. In addition to deriving the firm’s policies, we provide results on the values
of corporate claims, the agency cost of debt, and the optimal capital structure. Empirically,
we predict, among others, a lower sensitivity of capital investment to shocks to Tobin’s q
and cash flow for firms financed with renegotiable debt, and a negative effect of debt rene-
gotiability on the relationship between growth opportunities and systematic risk as well as
leverage.
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1. Introduction
One of the consequences of debt financing is its influence on the firm’s expansion policy.
As it is known from Myers (1977), the presence of outstanding (risky) debt leads to under-
investment, that is, a situation in which some positive net present value (NPV) projects are
foregone.1 Although the impact of debt on the firm’s investment policy has been widely
discussed in the literature, the existing contributions yield differing predictions concerning
the effect of debt renegotiability upon default on investment (see Myers (1977), Mella-Barral
and Perraudin (1997), and Mauer and Ott (2000)). In a unified dynamic model of a levered
firm, we explicitly analyze how the possibility of debt renegotiation upon financial distress
(before or after investment) affects the optimal exercise policy of the growth option.
∗Phone: +44 1524 592834, fax: +44 1524 847321, email: g.pawlina@lancaster.ac.uk.
1For literature on debt overhang, see, for example, Myers (1977), Mello and Parsons (1992), Parrino and
Weisbach (1999), Mauer and Ott (2000), Hennessy (2004), and Titman and Tsyplakov (2007).
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We show that the possibility of debt renegotiation upon default exacerbates the under-
investment problem at the times of the firm’s expansion. This additional underinvestment
increases with shareholders’ bargaining power vis-a`-vis creditors and is eliminated only if
the entire bargaining power lies with lenders. Moreover, if equityholders hold at least some
bargaining power, the investment delay increases with bankruptcy costs. As debt renego-
tiability is an inherent feature of private debt, our results clearly point out a disadvantage
of private relative to public debt that has been so far omitted from the literature: private
debt can make the underinvestment problem more severe.2 Moreover, as the possibility of
debt renegotiation becomes more remote when the enforcement of creditors’ rights improves
(Favara et al. (2009)), investment is expected to be inefficiently delayed predominantly in
legal systems in which the enforcement of debt contracts is weak. Empirically, we expect
the investment level of firms financed with renegotiable debt to be less responsive to positive
shocks to Tobin’s q and cash flow (earnings) compared to firms whose debt cannot be rene-
gotiated. The differences in the corresponding coefficients are likely to be larger for firms in
which the bargaining position of shareholders is stronger and bankruptcy costs are higher.
In the paper, we consider a firm run by shareholders and financed with perpetual debt.
The firm generates a stochastic profit flow, which can be scaled up by incurring an irreversible
investment cost. The timing of such an expansion is chosen by shareholders, who also bear
its cost. At any time, shareholders can trigger debt restructuring by defaulting on the
contractual coupon flow.
The exact nature of the restructuring process – formal bankruptcy or renegotiation – de-
pends on the type of outstanding debt. Debt can be either non-renegotiable or renegotiable.
Non-renegotiable debt would typically correspond to public debt, for which coordination
problems make renegotiation prohibitively expensive (Rajan (1992), Hege and Mella-Barral
(2005)), or to legal systems in which the enforcement of creditors’ rights is strong (Favara
et al. (2009)). In our model, default on non-renegotiable debt leads to bankruptcy. Renego-
tiable debt is associated with private (bank) debt (Berlin and Loeys (1988)), a concentrated
creditor base (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)), and with weak enforcement of debt contracts.
Default on such debt is followed by renegotiation leading in equilibrium to a reduction of
coupon payments.
The intuition underlying the mechanism of underinvestment is as follows (cf. Mauer
and Ott (2000) and Hennessy (2004)). When expanding the firm, shareholders not only
incur the investment cost but also face an erosion in the value of their option to default.
Upon expansion (strategic) default becomes less attractive as it is now associated with the
handover of a higher value of the firm to creditors than before expansion. Consequently, as
investment makes the default option worth less, shareholders delay it until its NPV becomes
sufficiently positive to compensate for the reduced option value.
What about the effect of debt renegotiability on the magnitude of underinvestment?
2The choice between the private and public debt has been explained in the literature by such factors
as flotation costs, monitoring incentives of the lender (Diamond (1984)), borrower’s reputation building
(Diamond (1991)), efficient liquidation hypothesis (Berlin and Loeys (1988)) and the distortion of managerial
incentives (Rajan (1992)).
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We know that shareholders prefer debt renegotiation to straight bankruptcy since they
generally receive a strictly positive payoff in the former case and zero in the latter. Also,
upon the firm’s expansion, the (absolute) reduction in the value of the option to renegotiate
is shown to be greater than of the option to go bankrupt. As a result, underinvestment is
exacerbated by debt renegotiability. Furthermore, when shareholders have more bargaining
power, their option to default is more valuable and its loss of value upon investment more
significant. Consequently, in such a case, equityholders delay investment by more than they
would if creditors had dominant bargaining power. Therefore, our second result follows:
higher equityholders’ bargaining power in debt renegotiation upon default results in more
severe underinvestment at the times of a firm’s expansion. Finally, the negative effect of
debt renegotiability on investment is stronger when bankruptcy costs, which determine the
surplus from renegotiation, are higher.
The paper makes therefore the following two main contributions. First, it identifies a
cost of renegotiable debt that has so far been omitted from the literature: renegotiable debt
can exacerbate the underinvestment problem.3 Second, it demonstrates that the investment
inefficiency can be mitigated by taking the bargaining power away from equityholders. As
such, it provides a rationale for a legal code that would favor creditors in a debt restructuring
process (cf. Davydenko and Franks (2008)).
Our results provide a number of testable hypotheses. Among others, we expect debt
renegotiability to strengthen the negative effect on investment of the debt overhang proxy
(cf. Hennessy et al. (2007)). Debt renegotiability is also expected to reduce the effect on
investment of positive cash flow (earnings) shocks. Furthermore, the effect of the growth
options on the systematic risk of equity (Carlson et al. (2004)) is going to be muted if the
firm is financed with renegotiable debt. As the underinvestment problem is expected to be
most severe for firms with outstanding renegotiable debt, we also predict a negative impact
of the interaction of debt renegotiability and growth opportunities on leverage.
Furthermore, we address the effect of the firm’s growth option on its optimal debt re-
structuring policy. In general, the presence of a positive NPV project delays default as it
makes its opportunity cost higher. However, the presence of such a project in combination
with high debtors’ bargaining power, is shown to result in an earlier timing of default on
renegotiable debt. Finally, we discuss the effect of debt renegotiability on the values of
corporate claims, the agency cost of debt, and the optimal capital structure.
A number of existing contributions can be nested in this paper’s framework. Setting the
coupon level equal to zero leads to the basic model of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) (see also
McDonald and Siegel (1986)) with the firm scaling up its activities. Excluding the renegoti-
ation possibility reduces the model to Mauer and Ott (2000). By setting the investment cost
to infinity and liquidation value to zero, one arrives at Fan and Sundaresan (2000), whereas
3Although in Rajan (1992) renegotiable (private) debt also leads to inefficient investment (underinvest-
ment in effort), the economics of our model is entirely different. In Rajan’s paper, the owner-manager is
reluctant to exert the optimal level of effort anticipating that the bank will hold her up when renewing
financing for the project. In our paper, higher underinvestment occurs as equityholders take into account
the more dramatic reduction in the value of the option to default.
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imposing a prohibitively high investment cost in combination with take-it or leave-it offers
and no taxes reduces the model to Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997).
Consequently, this paper builds upon Mauer and Ott (2000), who analyze the interaction
between leverage and the investment option when renegotiation is not allowed for, and both
Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), and Fan and Sundaresan (2000), who focus on strategic
debt service.4 Following these contributions, we restrict the cost of debt restructuring to be
a binary variable and do not limit its duration (see Hackbarth et al. (2002) and Franc¸ois
and Morellec (2004) for the relevant extensions).5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model of the firm is
described. Numerical results and comparative statics are presented in Section 3. Empirical
implications are discussed in Section 4, whereas conclusions are provided in Section 5. Proofs
of propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Model of a Levered Firm
As a starting point, both the firm and the stochastic environment in which it operates are
characterized. Subsequently, a dynamic valuation model of the firm following the exercise
of the growth option is developed. Using this model, we calculate the values of the claims
written on the firm’s cash flows and derive the optimal debt restructuring and liquidation
policies. These are used to derive results concerning the expansion policy of the firm.
2.1. Cash Flow Dynamics
Consider a firm that is run by a deep-pocket owner-manager (equityholders) maximizing
the value of equity. The firm generates instantaneous cash flow xt. The firm has an option
to expand by incurring sunk cost I. After spending I, the firm is entitled to cash flow θxt,
with θ > 1. Let indicator i ∈ {0, 1} be equal to 0 if the growth option has not yet been
exercised, and to 1 in the opposite case. The liquidation value of the firm is equal to γi.
All parties in the model are assumed to be risk-neutral and r is the instantaneous riskless
interest rate.6 The impact of economic uncertainty on the firm’s cash flow is captured by
letting xt follow a geometric Brownian motion
dxt = αxtdt+ σxtdwt, (1)
4In a related work, Mauer and Sarkar (2004), Sundaresan and Wang (2007), and Egami (2009) analyze
the effect of debt financing on the exercise policy of a growth option. However, neither of the papers allows
for the firm to be active prior to the option exercise. As a consequence, there is no initial debt outstanding
and the debt overhang problem, which is the focus of the current paper, does not exist.
5A far from complete list of references includes Vercammen (2000), analyzing how bankruptcy, triggered
by the assets value falling below the face value of the debt, influences investment, and Anderson and Sun-
daresan (1996), Mella-Barral (1999), and Acharya et al. (2006), analyzing the effect of debt renegotiability
on the values of corporate claims. A related work by Fischer et al. (1989), Mauer and Triantis (1994), and
Dangl and Zechner (2004), focuses on the optimal recapitalization policy.
6Alternatively, one could assume that the payout from the project is spanned by a portfolio of traded
assets.
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where α and σ correspond to the instantaneous growth rate and the volatility of the firm’s
cash flow, respectively, and dwt denotes a Wiener increment. We assume that α < r to
obtain finite valuations, and denote the return shortfall, r − α, by δ.
2.2. Payoffs upon Restructuring and Liquidation
Cash flow of the firm is subject to tax rate τ . The firm is financed with perpetual debt
with coupon b, which is tax deductible. Because of the limited liability, it is optimal for
equityholders to restructure debt in some states of nature. Equityholders restructure debt
at trigger level xri of cash flow process (1), which is chosen to maximize the value of equity.
This modeling approach is consistent with, for instance, Leland (1994), Mella-Barral and
Perraudin (1997), and Acharya and Carpenter (2002). Two types of debt restructuring upon
default are analyzed: bankruptcy and debt renegotiation.
In the situation in which default triggers formal bankruptcy, the absolute priority rule
(APR) is upheld and equityholders receive nothing.7 Once the firm is declared bankrupt,
creditors foreclose its assets and act as its managers. Creditors are less efficient than share-
holders when running the firm and the level of cash flow is ρθx provided the expansion option
has been exercised and ρx if it has not been, with ρ ∈ [0, 1]. It is assumed that it is not opti-
mal for creditors to liquidate the firm immediately upon bankruptcy. A sufficient condition
for this assumption to hold is γir < ρθ
i−1b (1− τ).8 Such a restriction on the liquidation
value implies that debt is risky.9 When cash flow process x reaches a sufficiently low level, it
becomes optimal for creditors to shut down the firm and to realize the liquidation value, γi.
Furthermore, the investment opportunity is lost upon bankruptcy. This assumption follows
the notion that creditors do not have human capital necessary for an economically viable
execution of the investment project and that they face, as a group, a significant coordination
problem in doing so. Finally, creditors cannot re-lever after foreclosing the firm’s assets.10
The divergence between the value of the firm managed by shareholders and its value in
the hands of creditors implies that there is a scope for debt renegotiation. Renegotiation
allows for avoiding the following three components of the bankruptcy costs. First, the
7Evidence presented by Franks and Torous (1989) indicates significant departures from the absolute
priority rule in many bankruptcy settlements. This assumption has been introduced for simplicity and
without it bankruptcy would occur for higher realizations of cash flow.
8A superscript attached to a symbol always denotes an exponent unless it is placed in parentheses.
9Allowing for a set of parameter values for which creditor initiated liquidation occurs upon bankruptcy
would not change the investment and default policies for a given coupon rate b but would affect debt value
and the ex ante choice of the optimal capital structure. As this assumption also rules out a situation in
which equityholders prefer to liquidate the firm and repay b/r to creditors, debt is risky. Sufficiently high
liquidation values would result in riskless debt and efficient investment.
10This assumption is made only for an analytical convenience. For the results to hold, the firm run
by creditors is assumed to satisfy at least one of the three following conditions: (i) it cannot re-lever
instantaneously so (a fraction of) the tax shield is lost upon bankruptcy, (ii) if bankruptcy occurs prior
to investment, the exercise price of growth option gets multiplied by a constant φ > 1 (e.g., to reflect the
coordination problems among creditors), with a special case φ→∞ meaning that the growth option expires
unexercised, (iii) debtholders will run the firm less efficiently, so that the cash flow generated by the firm
in their hands equals ρθi (1− τ)x, where ρ ∈ (0, 1).
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investment opportunity is preserved under renegotiation but not upon bankruptcy. Second,
the inefficiency resulting from creditors managing the firm (and generating reduced cash flow
ρx) is avoided. Finally, the tax shield on debt is not irreversibly lost but only temporarily
suspended.
2.3. Debt renegotiation
Following Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000), we allow
for the possibility of renegotiating the coupon payment so that bankruptcy can be avoided
and the surplus be split among equityholders and creditors. The renegotiation process is
formalized as Nash bargaining in which bargaining power is split between the two groups
of the firm’s stakeholders (Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Christensen et al. (2002)). The
distribution of bargaining power is captured by parameter η ∈ [0, 1]. A high (low) value
of η is associated with high bargaining power of equityholders (creditors). High bargaining
power of equityholders is expected for large corporations, and for firms with relatively low
R&D expenditures (Garlappi et al. (2008)). In contrast, small and young firms that use
a portfolio of the bank’s services and those for which an unexpected cash shortfall may
impair the innovation process are likely to have a much weaker bargaining position. In
addition, Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) argue that the equityholders’ incentives to exert
effort in renegotiation increase with insider ownership. Their notion is supported by the
empirical observation that deviations from the APR in Chapter 11 are significantly higher
when managers have an equity stake in the firm (Betker (1995), LoPucki and Whitford
(1990)). Finally, shareholders are expected to be more tough if institutional shareholdings
are relatively high. This is due to the fact that coordinated and more sophisticated investors
can bargain more effectively.
As debt renegotiation has a form of a strategic debt service, it is associated with a lower
than contractual coupon payment. We follow Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Fan
and Sundaresan (2000) in assuming that the coupon is a function of the current cash flow.11
Moreover, we impose the assumption made by Fan and Sundaresan (2000) that during the
renegotiation process the tax shield is temporarily suspended. As soon as the cash flow
from operations recovers and debtholders start receiving coupon b again, the tax shield is
restored.12 Therefore, the value of the firm as the bargaining object is endogenous to the
choice of the renegotiation trigger.13
11This approach allows for avoiding path-dependency leading to analytical intractability. Hege and Mella-
Barral (2000) make an alternative assumption that a once-reduced coupon cannot be increased.
12According to Fan and Sundaresan (2000), p. 1072, the temporary tax shield suspension in the renegotia-
tion region ”may be interpreted as debtholders agree to forgive some debt and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) suspends tax benefits until contractual payments are resumed.” An alternative approach is proposed
by Hege and Mella-Barral (2000), and Hackbarth et al. (2007), who assume that the magnitude of the tax
shield corresponds to the prevailing coupon payment.
13The possibility of debt renegotiation at the exercise boundary of the growth option is precluded. This
assumption can be motivated in the following way: suppose that there is a positive fixed cost of renegotiation
(incl. the suspension of the tax shield) and the scale of a single expansion is not too large. In such a case,
the benefits of renegotiation at an expansion threshold will not compensate for this cost. At the same time,
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As a result of bargaining, each party receives a fraction of the total firm value. First, the
value of the firm as a function of the equityholders’ renegotiation trigger is calculated and
the optimal sharing rule is determined. Second, the values of debt and equity are derived,
and the optimal equityholders’ renegotiation and investment policies as well as the firm’s
optimal liquidation rule are determined.
To obtain the valuation of claims and the optimal equityholders’ policies, the bargaining
game needs to be solved. Denote the value of the firm by Vi (x) and let ϕ
∗
i (x) be the
outcome of the Nash bargaining process being equal to the fraction of the firm received
by shareholders at cash flow level x. Consequently, shareholders receive ϕ∗i (x)Vi (x) and
the debtholders obtain (1− ϕ∗i (x))Vi (x). Fraction ϕ∗i (x) depends on the outside options of
equityholders and debtholders, that is, the payoffs that both parties would receive if they
decided to quit renegotiation. The outside options of equityholders and creditors are zero
and Ri (x), respectively, where Ri (x) is the value of the assets when the firm is managed by
creditors. Therefore, the solution of the bargaining game can be written as










From (2) it can be concluded that the fraction of the firm received by equityholders in the
renegotiation process critically depends on the creditors’ outside option, Ri (x). If Ri (x) = 0
(that is, if γi = ρ = 0), shareholders receive the fraction of the firm equal to their bargaining
power coefficient. In the opposite case, that is, when the creditors’ outside option equals
the value of the firm (ρ = 1, τ = 0, and i = 1), shareholders receive nothing.
The associated stream of coupon payments bri is exactly equal to fraction (1−ϕ∗i (x)) of
the net cash flow in the renegotiation region or b outside that region:
bri =





(1− η (1− ρ))xθi (1− τ) x ∈ (x(0)li , x
(1)
ri ],




The first regime of the strategic debt service corresponds to the earnings level remaining
between the firm’s optimal liquidation trigger, x
(1)
li




In this case, creditors receive a weighted average of cash flow from holding the collateral,
rγi, and from operating the firm efficiently, xθ
i (1− τ). These streams are weighted with
shareholders’ bargaining power coefficient, η. For the earnings level above x
(0)
li
, but still in
the renegotiation region, creditors receive a weighted average of cash flow from operating the
(costly) renegotiation at the lower boundary may still be optimal as its (positive) effect on the value of the
firm is likely to be substantial. Consequently, ruling out renegotiation at the investment threshold is aimed
to reflect a common situation in which a typical capital investment decision, and its potential departure
from the first-best policy, is associated with much less significant valuation implications than a decision to
default.
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company on their own, xρθi (1− τ), and from serving as fully efficient managers, xθi (1− τ).
Outside the renegotiation region, the contractual coupon, b, is paid.
Note that for τ = 0 and η ∈ {0, 1}, the coupon schedule corresponds to the outcome of
the take-it or leave-it offers in Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), whereas setting γi to zero
reduces the solution to the payment scheme of Fan and Sundaresan (2000). Furthermore, the
presence of the growth opportunity does not change the coupon flow to the creditors within
any of the three regimes. This finding follows from the fact that the investment opportunity,
which constitutes a part of the firm’s value, is not associated with any payment stream.
To differentiate between the claims’ values and policy triggers in the absence and in the
presence of renegotiation, we have introduced indicator k that assumes the value of 1 if
renegotiation occurs upon default and 0 otherwise. For notational convenience, we assume
that η > 0 implies k = 1 (when renegotiation is not allowed for, the distribution of bargaining
power is irrelevant anyway).
2.4. Valuation of Claims after Investment
By observing that equityholders maximize the value of their claim when selecting the
debt restructuring policy and that the liquidation policy maximizes the (remaining) value
of the firm and by solving the system of corresponding value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions, one can formulate the following proposition.14





1 (x), bankruptcy costs, BC
(k)
1 (x), equity, E
(k)
1 (x), and debt, D
(k)
1 (x), after in-








1 (x)− (1− k)BC1 (x) + L(k)1 xβ2 for x > x(k)l1




















for x ≤ x(k)r1
D
(k)
1 (x) = V
(k)

















































14At the optimal equityholders’ renegotiation trigger, the value of all claims remain differentiable. For
the equity it is the result of the smooth-pasting condition that guarantees optimality of the trigger. For the
value of the firm and its debt it is a no-arbitrage condition. Since the renegotiation process is reversible,
i.e., equityholders will restore the original coupon flow, b, as soon as the earnings process again exceeds the
critical threshold, xr1 , the first-order derivative of the value of all the claims must be continuous.
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and β1 (β2) is the positive (negative) root of the fundamental quadratic
1
2
σ2β (β − 1) +αβ−
r = 0. Ri (x) denotes the value of the firm managed by creditors. The optimal debt restruc-




bδ (1− τ + ητ)





















1 , and L
(k)
1 are defined by equations (A.6) and (A.15) in the
Appendix.
According to Proposition 1, which is in line with Fan and Sundaresan (2000), the value
of the firm, V1 (x), is the sum of the present values of cash flows, tax shield, TS1 (x), and of
the liquidation option, L1x
β2 .15 In a situation where bankruptcy occurs upon default, the
value of the firm is reduced by the present value of bankruptcy costs, BC1(x). The value of
equity is equal to the present value of cash flow from operations reduced by the present value
of coupon payments and augmented with the debt restructuring option, B1x
β2 . Following
debt restructuring, the values of equity and debt are equal to the corresponding fractions
of the firm value obtained according to the APR in case of bankruptcy upon default and
to the optimal sharing rule (2) when renegotiation is allowed for. The value of debt can
be simply calculated as the difference between the value of the firm and of its equity. The
value of tax shield is a product of its present value if operated perpetually, bτ/r, and the
probability weighted discounted time of its operation (the value of which depends on the
type of debt restructuring upon default). Finally, the value of the firm when managed by
creditors, R1(x), is equivalent to V
(0)
1 (x) with bankruptcy having already occurred.
From (4) it follows that the optimal renegotiation threshold increases with equityholders’
bargaining power, η, and decreases with creditors’ efficiency in managing the firm’s assets,
ρ. When creditors have the entire bargaining power, optimal renegotiation threshold equals
the bankruptcy trigger. In general, the optimal renegotiation trigger does not depend on
liquidation value γ1. This results from the fact that the change of the instantaneous payoff
when the renegotiation commences is not influenced by the collateral.16








is lower than the all-equity threshold as the strictly positive present value of tax
shield increases the opportunity cost of liquidation. Consequently, in the presence of taxes
the liquidation option is exercised later when the firm is partially financed with debt and
renegotiation is possible. In the absence of renegotiation, the firm is liquidated by creditors
at a higher level of x (cf. (5) with k = 0).
15Superscript (k) is omitted as long as doing so does not introduce any ambiguity.
16If γ1 was high enough so that R1 (xr1) = γ1, then the renegotiation trigger would depend on γ1. However,
this is ruled out by assumption. This result also is due to the special structure of optimal stopping problems
that also underlies the main conclusions of Leahy (1993) and Baldursson and Karatzas (1997).
9
2.5. Valuation of Claims before Investment
Following the derivation of the values of debt and equity after investment, it is possible to
determine the optimal policies and calculate the claims’ values before the expansion occurs.
The derivation of the optimal investment threshold, x, is done simultaneously with finding
the optimal debt restructuring, xr0 , and liquidation, xl0 , triggers. The values of corporate
securities before investment and the relevant policy triggers are found analogously as in
Proposition 1, with additional value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions ensuring the
continuity of the claim values at the investment threshold and reflecting the equityholders’
choice of the expansion policy.
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0 (x)− E(k)0 (x) for all x.

























bδ (1− τ + ητ)











































v , and L
(k)
0 are defined by equations (A.25), (A.29) and (A.31) in
the Appendix.
[Please insert Figure 1 about here]
The values of equity, debt, and the total value of the firm for k = 1 are depicted in Figure
1. In general, the value of the firm, V0 (x), consists of five components: cash flow from
operations, present value of tax shield, bankruptcy costs (positive for k = 0) and the options
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to expand and to liquidate. The value of equity before debt restructuring is equal to the
present value of cash flow from operations reduced by the value of riskless debt (net of the
tax shield) and augmented by the options to expand and to renegotiate the debt contract.
In the renegotiation region, the value of equity equals, again, the fraction of the firm value
derived according to the sharing rule (2). The value of debt equals the difference between
the total value of the firm and the value of equity.
From Proposition 2 it follows that investment, debt restructuring and liquidation trig-
gers are affected by the the growth and bankruptcy options being interrelated. The first
component of the expansion trigger (6) is simply equal to the optimal investment threshold
of an all-equity firm (with no option to exit). The second component reflects the change
in the value of the debt restructuring option upon the expansion (B1x
β2 − B0xβ2). As long
as B1 is different from B0, the latter component is different from zero and the expansion
policy of a debt financed company differs from the policy of an otherwise identical all-equity
financed firm.
The optimal debt restructuring trigger of the firm is given by (7). Its first component
equals the default trigger of an otherwise identical firm but without the growth option (cf.
(4)). Its second component reflects the impact of the growth option on the timing of debt
restructuring. A similar decomposition can be made for the liquidation trigger (8). In this
case, the intuition is very simple: the opportunity cost of liquidation is higher when the
growth option is present.
2.6. Underinvestment and the Effect of Debt Renegotiability
Before formulating the relevant proposition, we illustrate the mechanism of underinvest-
ment with the following example. Assume that upon completing the investment project,
the present value of the firm’s cash flow will increase by $16. The investment cost is $10.
The face value of debt is $14 and it is assumed that equityholders declare bankruptcy if the
present value of discounted future cash flow falls to $8. The value of the option to default
is $3 (which is equal to the probability-weighted discount factor associated with the event
of default, assumed to be 0.5, times the payoff on default, $14 − $8 = $6). After invest-
ment, cash flow is higher, so the probability of hitting the equityholders’ optimal default
boundary is lower (and assumed to be equal to 0.17). This results in a new value of the
bankruptcy option, $1. Consequently, the NPV of the investment project that accrues to
the shareholders equals (in $) 16−10−3+1 = 4. Now, assume that the threshold profitabil-
ity of the project at which irreversible investment is optimally made equals 1.5. Since the
profitability of the project is 16/10 = 1.6, investment should be undertaken. However, the
presence of risky debt financing will lead to underinvestment as the equityholders will not
exercise the investment opportunity at the current profitability level (from their viewpoint,
the profitability of the project is only 1.4).
Proposition 3. Risky debt financing leads to underinvestment in the sense of the optimal
equityholders’ investment threshold x being higher that the optimal investment threshold x(e)
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(θ − 1)(1− τ) ≡ x
(e). (9)
Proposition 3, the proof of which is presented in the Appendix for the special case of τ = γi =
0, is a direct implication of the debt restructuring option being worth less after the growth
option is exercised than before the firm’s expansion. In other words, equityholders not only
incur the cost of expansion but also face a reduction of the value of their debt restructuring
option (cf. Myers (1977)). The mechanism of the reduction in the option value to restructure
debt can be explained using the following options analogy. Prior to investment, the debt
restructuring option is equivalent (ignoring the interaction between options) to a put on the
present value of perpetual cash flow x (or the fraction (1 − ϕ∗i ) thereof when renegotiation
is possible) with a strike price equal to b (1− τ) /r. After investment, the strike remains
the same but the put is written on the present value of θx (or its corresponding fraction)
received in perpetuity. Obviously, the value of the latter put option is lower.17
The intuition behind Proposition 3 follows from equation (6). When the possibility
of debt restructuring exits, the optimal investment rule requires that the present value of
the expansion project must be equal to the two following components. First, it has to
compensate for the sunk cost, I, multiplied by markup β1/(β1 − 1) (> 1). Second, it has
to compensate for the loss in option value to restructure debt, (B0 − B1)xβ2 , multiplied by
markup (β1 − β2)/(β1 − 1).18 (In fact, a similar mechanism based on interacting options
influences the timing of debt restructuring (7) and of corporate liquidation (8).)
The markups can have a significant effect on the decision timing. When model parameters
of Section 4 (r = 5%, δ = 4% and σ = 0.236) are adopted, an incremental dollar of an
investment cost requires an additional 1.698/0.698× $1 = $2.43 of the present value of the
investment project to make the expansion worthwhile. Furthermore, a one-dollar loss in the
option value to restructure debt requires an extra (1.698− (−1.057))/0.698× $1 = $3.95 of
the project value. (Similarly, one extra dollar gained upon debt restructuring and liquidation
is needed to compensate for every foregone $0.51 of the present value of cash flow and for
every $0.38 of the option value to expand.)
Now, the main proposition of the paper can be formulated.
Proposition 4. Strategic debt restructuring under financial distress exacerbates the under-
investment problem in the sense of the expansion option being exercised later than in the
presence of bankruptcy occurring upon default.
17In fact, the two options differ only with respect to the initial price of the underlying and the latter
option is more out of the money. The ratio of the option values (ignoring the interaction of the former with
the growth option) is therefore equal to the discounted probability of cash flow falling from θx to x, that is,
to θβ2 < 1.
18The latter markup is greater that the markup on the investment cost since β2 < 0.
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In a situation where shareholders can renegotiate the debt contract, underinvestment is
more severe than upon bankruptcy occurring upon default. This is a result of the fact that
the option to renegotiate debt generally has a higher value than an analogous option to go
bankrupt. Since the value of the option to restructure debt (i.e., either to renegotiate or to
go bankrupt) decreases upon the firm’s expansion, and the proportional reduction is similar
across the two types of options (and is of the order of θ−β2), the absolute reduction in the
value of the renegotiation option must be higher than in the option value to go bankrupt
(in fact, the latter difference is of the order of (1 − ϕ∗)β2(1 − θβ2) of the initial value of
the bankruptcy option). To summarize, the higher magnitude of underinvestment with
renegotiable debt is driven by a greater absolute reduction in the option value to restructure
debt occurring upon the firm’s expansion.
2.7. Effect of Growth Opportunities on Liquidation and Strategic Default
The growth option affects, through its impact on the value of equity and the firm as a
whole, the optimal liquidation and debt restructuring policies. As far as its impact on the






with the equality holding for k = 0 (the growth option is lost upon bankruptcy so it does
not affect the liquidation policy even with no expansion having been made). For k = 1,
the presence of the growth option raises the opportunity cost of liquidating the firm. As a
consequence, the firm is liquidated optimally at a cash flow level lower than γ0θxl1/γ1.
The relationship between xr0 and the debt restructuring trigger of an otherwise identical
firm but without the growth option, θxr1 , is more subtle and, in general, ambiguous. Before
expansion, the value of equity contains an additional component reflecting the value of the
growth option. Other things being equal, this makes debt restructuring less attractive (so
it would call for xr0 being lower than θxr1). In fact, this is exactly the outcome for k = 0.
However, for k = 1, there is another opposing effect: it is possible that the value of the
firm, as the object of bargaining, is higher when the investment opportunity is present.
Therefore, from the perspective of equityholders, renegotiation can ceteris paribus become
more attractive. Since these two effects work in opposite directions, the presence of the
growth opportunity can, in general, either raise or lower the renegotiation trigger.
Proposition 5. The optimal strategic debt restructuring trigger in the presence of the in-
vestment opportunity can either be lower or higher than the corresponding trigger in a situ-
ation where the growth option is absent. The condition η > η∗ such that
η∗Gv = G (11)
implicitly defines the range of parameter η in which the presence of the investment opportu-
nity results in earlier debt restructuring.
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From Proposition 5 it follows that in the presence of the growth option, renegotiation
commences earlier than without the opportunity to expand if and only if the fraction of
the growth option that accrues to shareholders under renegotiation, ηGvx
β1 , exceeds the
current shareholders’ value of the option to invest, Gxβ1 .19 This means that if bargaining
power parameter η is sufficiently high, it is optimal for shareholders holding the investment
opportunity to begin renegotiation earlier than in the absence of the growth option. By
doing so, shareholders forego the component of the value of equity associated with the
expansion option but they are more than compensated by receiving a fraction of the firm’s
value including the total value of the growth option (i.e., the sum of the fractions of the
value of the investment opportunity that accrue to equityholders and creditors). If debt
restructuring has a form of bankruptcy, the presence of the growth option always delays the
equityholders’ decision to default.
This finding has a direct implication for the credit risk analysis. Namely, the presence of
an additional asset (the growth option) when its value in the first-best use (i.e., when held
by equityholders) substantially exceeds its value in the second-best use (i.e., when held by
creditors) can reduce the firm’s distance to default if strategic default is allowed for.
3. Numerical Results
This section presents numerical results and comparative statics concerning the firm’s
optimal policies, the values of its claims, agency costs, and the optimal capital structure
choice. Our basic set of parameters is to reflect a typical US non-financial firm. Interest
rate r is 5%, which is consistent with the long-term after tax interest rate (see Strebulaev
(2007)). The return shortfall is assumed to equal 4%, which is consistent with the long-term
payout ratio reported by Grullon and Michaely (2002). Volatility parameter σ equals 0.236,
which is the average asset volatility based on the sample of Eom et al. (2004) and the asset
volatility of firms with A-rated bonds reported in Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007). The
tax advantage of debt equals 0.1875 and is based on Graham (2000).20 The efficiency of
creditors as the users of the firm’s assets, ρ, is assumed to equal 0.63, which is the lower
bound of estimates reported in Alderson and Betker (1996).21 Furthermore, in the base case
scenario the assumption of η = 0.75 is adopted.22
19Obviously, condition (11) never holds for bankruptcy occurring upon default (the LHS is zero, as k = 0
implies η = 0, and its RHS is always positive).
20The tax advantage of debt is τ = 1 − (1−τc)(1−τe)1−τp = 1 − ((1 − 0.12)(1 − 0.35))/(1 − 0.296), where τc,
τe, and τp denote the marginal corporate tax rate, tax rate on equity income and interest income tax rate,
respectively. Once we allow for the personal taxes in our model, b is the after-tax coupon, r – the after-tax
interest rate, and x – the gross cash flow of the firm scaled down by (1− τp).
21In fact, for η = 0.5, creditors’ efficiency ρ equal to 0.63 would correspond to the average recovery rate of
0.37 reported by Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) for bankruptcy auctions conditional on a going-concern sale.
22The mean value of the estimate of shareholder bargaining power in the recent paper by Morellec et al.
(2008) is 0.457. We decided to adopt a higher value of η in the base case scenario, as these are the firms with
dominant shareholders’ bargaining power that are likely to face the additional underinvestment problem
analyzed in the paper. When deriving the expansion policy, agency costs and the optimal capital structure,
we allow this parameter to vary.
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The remaining six parameters of the model are implied from the real-world variables using
the following four relationships and two additional conditions (on the ratio of liquidation
values before and after the expansion and market capitalization).
Tobin’s q (D(x0) + E(x0))/(I/(θ − 1))
Debt Value/Firm Value D(x0)/(D(x0) + E(x0))
Credit Spread b/D(x0)− r
Liquidation Value/Face Value of Debt (P (x0)γ0 + (1− P (x0))γ1)/(b/r)
Tobin’s q, which is the ratio of the market value of the firm’s capital stock over its
replacement value, is assumed to equal 2.49, that is, the mean value in the Compustat
industrial files between 1968 and 2003, as reported in Hennessy et al. (2007).23 The ratio of
debt value to the market value of the firm is 0.33, which is equal to the mean leverage ratio
in Bernanke et al. (1990) and close to 0.36 obtained by Strebulaev (2007). Credit spread is
assumed to be equal to 81 basis points, which is equivalent to the mean spread in the sample
of A-rated bonds in Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007). The ratio of liquidation value to the
face value of debt is equal to 0.26 and is based on the average recovery rate in a bankruptcy
auction conditional on piecemeal liquidation, as reported by Eckbo and Thorburn (2008).
As in our model the liquidation value depends on whether expansion has already taken place,
we use an average of liquidation values before and after the expansion, weighted with the
probabilities (P (x0) and 1−P (x0), respectively) of each of the scenarios occur.24 Moreover,
we assume that liquidation values are proportional to the cash-flow generating ability of
assets, that is, that γ1 = θγ0. Finally, we impose the additional condition that the market
capitalization of the firm is US$100 million, which approximately equals the capitalization
of the median US non-financial firm in the Compustat universe.
To obtain the model parameter values b, I, x0, γ0, γ1, and θ, we solve the system
of equations of Proposition 2 augmented for the four conditions based on the values of
observables (Tobin’s q, Debt Value/Firm Value, Credit Spread, and Liquidation Value/Face
Value of Debt) and the two additional conditions on the ratio of liquidation values before
and after the expansion and market capitalization. As a consequence, the (unobservable)
six parameters of the model are determined simultaneously with the decision thresholds and
claim values.25 The resulting values for these parameters as well as for the thresholds and
values are as follows (all the monetary values are denominated in US$ million).
23Our model is in fact silent about the capital stock installed, so we base the replacement value of the
firm’s assets in place on the characteristics of the available expansion project. As the additional cash flow
(θ − 1)x is associated with investment cost I, the current level of cash flow x is assumed to be generated
with assets with the replacement value of I/(θ − 1).




with ν ≡ − 2ασ2 + 1. If x is hit first, liquidation at xl1 occurs with probability 1 as for a geometric Brownian
motion with drift rate α = 0.01 < 0.028 = 0.5σ2 the probability of wandering off to infinity is zero. See also
Dixit (1993).
25As the model is homogenous of degree 1 in b, I, x0, γ0, and γ1, the multiplication of these parameters
by a constant allows to re-interpret the results for a firm of a different size.
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b = 2.862 x = 7.674
I = 49.981 xr0 = 1.778
x0 = 5.001 xl0 = 0.214
γ0 = 9.236 E(x0) = 100
γ1 = 16.936 D(x0) = 49.254
θ = 1.834 V (x0) = 149.254
Unless stated otherwise, these parameter values are used in the subsequent numerical
illustrations.
3.1. Optimal Policies
The major finding concerning the impact of the renegotiability of debt on the expansion
policy is that the option to restructure debt in a period of financial distress exacerbates
Myers’ (1977) underinvestment problem. A larger magnitude of underinvestment means
that the growth option is exercised later than in the absence of the option to renegotiate
(see Figure 2, Panels A–C). For the basic set of parameter values, cash flow level x(1) = 7.674
triggers investment if debt is renegotiable, whereas x(0) = 7.445 is already sufficient to trigger
expansion otherwise.
[Please insert Table 1 about here.]
The comparative statics for the optimal investment, debt restructuring, and liquidation
policies are depicted in Table 1. Some of the results are consistent with those known from
the real options literature (McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Ch.
6), structural valuation of corporate debt pricing (Leland (1994, 1998), Mella-Barral and
Perraudin (1997), Fan and Sundaresan (2000)), and on investment under debt financing
(Mauer and Ott (2000), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007), Hennessy (2004), and Moyen (2007)).
Therefore, in the remainder of the section, we focus on those results that are novel to this
paper.
[Please insert Figure 2 about here.]
(i) The magnitude of underinvestment increases with book leverage, measured as the
instantaneous coupon flow b. This result holds for both bankruptcy and renegotiation
occurring upon default (see Figure 2, Panel A).26
(ii) The magnitude of additional underinvestment following from the renegotiability of
debt is positively related to the equityholders’ bargaining power η (see Figure 2, Panel
B). For example, the change from η = 0.1 (dominant bargaining power of creditors)
26To compare, the optimal threshold under the first-best investment policy (that is, the policy that
maximizes the total value of the firm) decreases with leverage and is lower than that of the all-equity
financed firm. The latter result is due to the fact that investment not only augments the firm’s cash flow
but also enhances the present value of tax shield and reduces the economic cost of default.
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to η = 0.9 (dominant bargaining power of equityholders) results in an increase of the
expansion threshold from 7.464 to 7.767. This relationship follows from the negative
change in the option value to renegotiate, which occurs upon investment, being larger
(in absolute terms) for higher values of η.27
Obviously, shareholders’ bargaining power has no impact on the investment policy of
a firm whose debt is non-renegotiable (see x(0) and x(0,f) in Figure 2, Panel B).
(iii) The effect of creditors’ outside option, captured by their efficiency parameter ρ, is
illustrated in Panel C of Figure 2. Higher efficiency of creditors as the potential
owners-managers of the firm reduces the equityholders’ value of renegotiation. As a
consequence, the absolute difference in the values of the option to renegotiate before
and after investment is smaller, which results in lower underinvestment. For example,
for the basic set of parameter values an increase in ρ from 0.1 to 0.9 would result in
the reduction of the expansion threshold from 8.154 to 7.574.
Again, for non-renegotiable debt, ρ has no impact on the expansion policy pursued by
equityholders.28
(iv) The effect of the growth option on the renegotiation trigger is, in general, ambiguous
and crucially depends on the equityholders’ bargaining power, η (see Proposition 5).
For most values of η (η < 0.94 for the basic set of parameter values), the presence
of the growth option negatively influences the equityholders’ willingness to engage in
debt renegotiation. However, if shareholders expect to extract most of the bargaining
proceeds (η close to 1), they commence renegotiation earlier since the growth option
enhances the value of the firm as the bargaining object.
3.2. Valuation of Securities
As long as shareholders’ bargaining power parameter η is strictly positive, the option to
renegotiate enhances the value of equity. This property follows from the fact that share-
holders can do in the process of renegotiation at least as well as in the case of bankruptcy
occurring upon default.
Equityholders’ option to renegotiate may adversely affect the value of debt. This out-
come occurs when the renegotiation trigger is considerably higher than the bankruptcy
threshold of an otherwise identical firm but financed with non-renegotiable debt and the
financial position of the firm (measured by x0) is sound. For example, for the basic set of
parameter values the value of renegotiable debt D(x0) is US$49.254 million. If an otherwise
27If the timing of investment was chosen so as to maximize the value of the firm financed with renegotiable
debt, the optimal investment threshold would decrease with η (see x(1,f)) due to the higher value of the tax
shield.
28Creditors’ efficiency ρ positively influences the optimal investment threshold when the expansion policy
is chosen so to maximize the total value of the firm. When debt renegotiation becomes more remote, the
present value of additional tax shield due to investment becomes smaller. Consequently, other things being
equal, investment becomes less attractive. Since higher ρ reduces the probability of renegotiation, it also
raises the investment threshold.
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identical firm was financed with non-renegotiable debt, the value of creditors’ claim would
be higher by US$1.291 million, that is, by 2.62%. On the other hand, for x0 close enough
to the bankruptcy trigger, allowing for renegotiation increases the value of debt since cred-
itors’ share of the firm received upon renegotiation is worth more than their claim upon
bankruptcy.
Table 2 depicts the direction of the effects of model parameters on the valuation of equity,
debt and the firm as a whole.
[Please insert Table 2 about here.]
(v) The interaction between the options to invest and to renegotiate can influence the
value of debt in both directions. If equityholders’ bargaining power is so high that
renegotiation commences earlier when the growth option is present (see Proposition 5),
then the growth option can reduce the value of debt. Nevertheless, for most parameter
configurations, the value of renegotiable debt is augmented by the presence of the
growth option, due to a lower probability of strategic default.
3.3. Agency Cost of Debt and Incremental Debt Overhang
The ex post departure from the first-best investment policy results in a higher cost of
debt at the time of its issuance. This higher cost, in turn, leads to a lower ex ante value
of the firm. The presence of the option to renegotiate the debt contract can exacerbate the
agency cost of debt.29
We measure the agency cost of debt, AC(x), as the difference between the firm values
under the first-best and the equity value-maximizing investment policies. In the absence of
taxes and bankruptcy costs, the agency cost equals the reduction of the value of the firm in
relation to an otherwise identical all-equity financed firm.
Since the main focus of this subsection is to investigate the magnitude of the agency
cost of debt related to the underinvestment problem, we use the default trigger of the firm
pursuing the optimal investment policy as the default trigger of the firm’s investment policy
that maximizes the equity value. Such a choice allows for isolating the effect of differing first-
and second-best investment policies from the effect of differing debt restructuring policies
(as in Mauer and Ott (2000)).30
Top two rows of Table 3 describe the signs of sensitivities of the agency cost of debt to
changes in model parameters. The third row of Table 3 describes changes in the agency cost
of renegotiable debt in relation to analogous changes associated with a debt contract that
cannot be renegotiated.
29The agency costs of debt have been analyzed in the literature in the context of investment decisions
for the case of shareholders’ propensity to change riskiness of the firm’s assets (Leland (1998), Ericsson
(2001), and Subramanian (2007)), and the timing of investment (Mauer and Ott (2000)), and considered
non-renegotiable debt.
30In fact, this restriction potentially induces a bias against finding the agency cost. This is due to the fact
that the equityholders’ default options are not exercised optimally in the second-best case, which in principle
reduces the equityholders’ opportunity cost of expansion and, as a consequence, their optimal investment
threshold.
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[Please insert Table 3 about here.]
An increase in leverage raises the agency cost of debt since the magnitude of the deviation
from the firm value-maximizing investment policy increases with a higher proportion of debt.
Moreover, changes in coupon rate b have a similar first-order effect on the agency cost of
both renegotiable and non-renegotiable debt.
Equityholders’ bargaining power coefficient η influences the agency cost of renegotiable
debt through its positive impact on the renegotiation trigger. Consequently, the agency
cost of debt due to underinvestment increases since equityholders become more reluctant to
forego a fraction of the (higher) option value to renegotiate. With non-renegotiable debt,
the bargaining power coefficient does not play any role since it does not affect the optimal
investment trigger.
Creditors’ ability to manage the firm’s assets, ρ, reduces the agency cost of both kinds
of debt. For non-renegotiable debt, higher ρ reduces the present value of inefficiencies
arising when the firm becomes managed by the creditors. For renegotiable debt, in addition,
an increase in ρ negatively influences the probability of strategic default. Therefore, the
reduction in the agency costs which results from higher ρ is greater for renegotiable debt.
The moneyness of growth options, measured by both θ and the inverse of I, exacerbates
the agency cost of debt. This is due to larger differences in the present values of cash flows
before and after investment under first- and second-best policies. This effect is generally
stronger for renegotiable debt since (i) the growth option contains not only the right to
acquire higher cash flows but also a right to reduce the possibility of debt restructuring, and
(ii) for strategic default, the latter possibility is of much higher importance.31
Panels A and B of Figure 3 illustrate the magnitude of the agency cost of renegotiable
and non-renegotiable debt attributed to underinvestment as a function of the cash flow
variable x. It can be seen that the renegotiability of the debt contract can substantially
increase this cost. In the first case, we use the basic set of parameter values (Panel A). In
the second scenario, we consider a firm operating in a declining and less volatile industry,
with δ = σ = 0.1, in which (strategic) default is more likely and the option values of waiting
are lower (Panel B).
[Please insert Figure 3 about here.]
In the basic scenario, for cash flow level x0 = 5.001 the agency cost of debt induced
by the underinvestment problem equals $0.181 million. The maximum cost in this scenario
amounts to $0.322 million and occurs for x = 7.044. The agency cost of debt highly depends
on equityholders’ bargaining power. If equityholders can extract most of the surplus from
bargaining, the agency cost is relatively high. For η = 0.9 the maximum magnitude of the
31In addition, the agency cost of debt decreases with cash flow volatility as a result of the investment
threshold being higher for both kinds of debt. Furthermore, it is positively related to the return shortfall, δ,
and negatively related to the riskless rate, r. This is due to the fact that the probability of debt restructuring
increases with δ (decreases with r) so timely investment becomes more (less) important for reducing the
expected cost of default.
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agency cost of debt is $0.449 million. Conversely, the agency cost of debt with creditors
having more bargaining power (η = 0.1) is low and equals up to a modest $0.114 million. To
compare, the agency cost of debt for the non-renegotiable contract can reach $0.239 million.
In fact, if creditors can make take-it or leave-it offers, the agency cost is the lowest and
always below the level corresponding to non-renegotiable debt.
The relationship between AC(0) and AC(1) can be explained as follows. For η = 0, the
investment and default policies associated with renegotiable debt are the same as with a
non-renegotiable contract. For the same investment and default policies the agency cost
of non-renegotiable debt is higher because of the bankruptcy costs associated with default.
Therefore, if creditors hold the entire bargaining power, AC(1) is smaller than AC(0). As
equityholders’ bargaining power increases, a second effect comes into play – underinvest-
ment becomes more severe. In fact, a level of η exists for which there is no advantage of
renegotiable debt anymore as the effect of additional underinvestment offsets the benefit of
avoiding costly bankruptcy. For values of parameter η above this level, the effect of higher
underinvestment dominates and AC(1) exceeds AC(0).
An observation that is immediately made upon comparing Panels A and B of Figure 3 is
that the agency cost of debt is much more severe when the dynamics of the firm’s operating
cash flow exhibits a relatively large return shortfall and low volatility. For example, the
maximum agency cost of debt in the basic case ($0.322 million, which translates into 0.14%
of the firm value) is dwarfed by an impressive $3.377 million, or 4.52% of the firm value, in
the negative growth-low volatility scenario. The cost for η = 0.9 is even higher and amounts
to $3.797 million. This result is explained by the fact that an excessive delay in making a
value-enhancing investment in a declining industry with a little chance of a reversal in the
trend may result in the investment not being undertaken at all.
To quantify the effect of debt renegotiability on the firm value that comes entirely from its
impact on the investment policy, we introduce a measure of incremental debt overhang, IDO.
IDO is defined as the difference between the value of the firm financed with renegotiable debt
but which pursues the investment policy of an otherwise identical firm but financed with non-
renegotiable debt and the value of the firm financed with renegotiable debt. Consequently,
incremental debt overhang captures the effect of the additional investment delay resulting
from debt renegotiability on the firm value. The signs of sensitivities of the incremental
debt overhang to changes in model parameters are presented in the bottom row of Table 3.
Similar to the agency cost of renegotiable debt, incremental debt overhang increases with
the coupon rate, equityholders bargaining power, return shortfall and the moneyness of the
growth option. Just like AC(1), IDO decreases with creditors efficiency as users of the firm’s
assets, cash flow volatility and the interest rate.
The magnitude of incremental debt overhang is shown as a function function of the cash
flow variable x in Panels C (basic scenario) and D (negative growth-low volatility scenario) of
Figure 3.32 In the basic scenario (for x0 = 5.001), incremental debt overhang translates into
a reduction of firm value of $0.097 million. The maximum incremental overhang amounts
32Agency costs are differentiable for any x lower than the second-best threshold x(k) as the firm value
is differentiable at the first-best investment threshold x(k,f)(< x(k)). Incremental debt overhang exhibits a
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to $0.197 million and occurs for x = 7.445. As expected, higher equityholders’ bargaining
power exacerbates the debt overhang problem. For η = 0.9 the maximum magnitude of IDO
is $0.303 million. When it is creditors’ bargaining power that is high (η = 0.1), incremental
debt overhang is almost negligible since the investment policy becomes very close to the one
of the firm financed with non-renegotiable debt. IDO equals then up to $0.012 million.
Analogously as with the agency cost, incremental debt overhang is much more severe
when the firm’s operating cash flow exhibits a large return shortfall and low volatility. The
maximum IDO in such a scenario equals $1.782 million, or 2.03% of the firm value, for
η = 0.75 and $2.264 million (2.59% of the firm value) for η = 0.9. Again, the incremental
debt overhang is much higher for the negative growth-low volatility scenario as any additional
delay in investment may result in the growth option being never exercised. Despite being
optimal for equityholders, foregoing the expansion in such a case is detrimental to the firm
value.
The results of our analysis indicate that higher flexibility of renegotiable debt does have
its cost. Shareholders’ inability to pre-commit to the optimal investment policy, or (at least)
to the policy pursued with non-renegotiable debt financing, results in a potentially higher
ex ante cost of debt.
3.4. Optimal Capital Structure and Debt Capacity
The presence of the renegotiation option affects the optimal capital structure in two
opposite ways (see Fan and Sundaresan (2000)). On the one hand, the possibility of avoiding
bankruptcy costs works towards increasing optimal leverage. On the other hand, the loss of
the tax shield in the region of strategic debt service impairs the firm’s ability to increase its
value through further increases in the debt level. The trade-off between these two effects is
strongly influenced by the presence of the growth opportunity.
A higher proportion of the growth option component in the firm’s total value generally
reduces the optimal market leverage (defined as the ratio of the value of debt and the total
value of the firm). This is a result of the debt capacity of growth options (measured as
the incremental optimal debt associated with an additional asset, see Barclay et al. (2006))
being lower than the debt capacity of assets in place. Consequently, market leverage of the
firm with the growth option is lower than the optimal leverage of an otherwise identical
firm but with assets in place only. Introducing the option to renegotiate the debt contract
generally amplifies the negative impact of the growth option on the optimal leverage level
(see Table 4, columns ∆LEV (0) and ∆LEV (1)).
[Please insert Table 4 about here.]
Similarly as in Leland (1994), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), and Mauer and Ott (2000),
the optimal coupon rate increases with the current value of the project, x0, the riskless rate,
r, the tax rate, τ , and the creditors’ efficiency parameter, ρ (see Table 4). Moreover, it
kink at the non-renegotiable threshold x(0)(< x(1)) as this threshold does not maximize the overall value of
the firm.
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decreases when return shortfall δ high and (for renegotiable debt) when cash flow volatility
σ is low. Moreover, the optimal leverage decreases with equityholders’ bargaining power
parameter η.
When debt is renegotiable, introducing the growth option reduces the leverage most
dramatically for high levels of earnings x0, and for high moneyness of the growth option
(low I). The interaction between the growth and debt renegotiation options appears to be
the main driving force of a lower optimal leverage when equityholders bargaining power is
high. In the basic case, the presence of the growth option reduces the optimal leverage by
11.77 percentage points. In contrast, when creditors have much say in the debt restructuring
process (η = 0.25), the growth option does not have a big effect on market leverage in the
optimum – the reduction is a mere 5.04%.
The results of this section therefore indicate that low market leverage (cf. Graham (2000)
and Morellec (2004)) may be to a certain extent attributed to the interaction of their growth
options with the strategic default option. The negative joint effect of the growth option and
debt renegotiability is namely shown to be stronger than a simple superposition of the effects
of the growth option and debt renegotiability. In other words, leverage is expected to be
negatively correlated with the interaction term of a proxy for growth opportunities (such as
Tobin’s q) and debt renegotiability.
The presence of the investment option may result in a higher total face value of debt,
b∗/r, at the optimal leverage level. Still, the increment of a face value of debt due to the
growth option is generally lower (and at times negative) when debt is renegotiable. Again,
the adverse effect of the growth option on the optimal coupon level is the highest when
shareholders have substantial bargaining power.
Debt renegotiability and the presence of the growth option affect the firm’s debt capacity,
defined as the maximum market value of debt the firm is able to issue. Already in the absence
of growth options, debt capacity of renegotiable debt is lower than of its non-renegotiable
counterpart when equityholders’ bargaining power is considerable (cf. η = 0.75 in our basic
case). Debt capacity of renegotiable debt also increases with creditors’ bargaining power.
These two results (see Table 4) are consistent with Fan and Sundaresan (2000). The growth
option results in a higher debt capacity since it is associated with a higher opportunity cost
of default (due to foregoing the growth option upon default). The presence of the growth
option improves debt capacity irrespective of the debt restructuring procedure employed
and of the distribution of bargaining power. However, the incremental debt capacity of
the growth option is generally limited when debt is renegotiable. Again, such a reduced
incremental debt capacity is most apparent when equityholders’ bargaining power η is high.
In contrast, renegotiable debt combined with high creditors’ ability to manage the firm,
ρ, and low equityholders’ bargaining power has a higher (incremental) capacity than non-
renegotiable debt.
3.5. Type of Debt and the Value of the Firm
We conclude the discussion of numerical results with the analysis of the optimal choice of
the type of debt. In the existing literature, the choice between non-renegotiable and renego-
tiable (or, public and private) debt is explained by, among others, flotation costs, monitoring
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incentives of the lender (Diamond (1984)), borrower’s reputation building (Diamond (1991)),
the efficiency of a liquidation procedure (Berlin and Loeys (1988)) and managerial incentives
(Rajan (1992)). In our framework, renegotiable debt allows, on the one hand, for avoiding
bankruptcy costs and premature liquidation. On the other hand, it not only leads to an
earlier (strategic) default (cf. Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) but is also associated with
additional underinvestment.
The optimal choice of the type of debt is made by comparing the value of the firm at
its optimal capital structure for both types of debt. We calculate the value of the firm for
an array of parameter values such that for each entry up to 2 parameter values differ from
the basic case (see Table 5). In such a way, we are able to detect the effect of potential
interactions between any two parameters on the optimal choice of debt.
[Please insert Table 5 about here.]
For the basic set of parameter values, renegotiable debt allows for increasing the value
of the firm by 2.52%. In particular, the advantage of renegotiable debt can be observed
when bargaining power of equityholders is relatively low (η = 0.25). In this case, debt
renegotiability adds 7.58% to the firm value. With low equityholders’ bargaining power,
the benefit of renegotiable debt increases with the effective tax rate and is substantially
eroded when cash flow volatility is low. The latter result follows from the fact that lower
σ makes default considerations less relevant. Perhaps a bit surprisingly, higher bankruptcy
costs generally reduce the advantage of renegotiable debt. For example, for ρ = 0.25 and
the remaining parameter values as in the basic scenario, the advantage of renegotiable debt
falls to 0.85%. This result is caused by the positive relation between these costs and the
strategic default threshold. Although renegotiation allows for avoiding costly bankruptcy, it
triggers an earlier default, which adversely affects the present value of tax shield as well as
the efficiency of the investment policy. In fact, in the presence of high interest rates, a high
return shortfall or a low profit volatility, non-renegotiable debt is optimal when bankruptcy
costs are high (for ρ = 0.25, debt renegotiability reduces the firm value by up to 5.54%).
Furthermore, upon analyzing the last column of Table 5 we conclude that high tax rate
almost uniformly favors non-renegotiable debt. The intuition is similar to that in the case
of high bankruptcy costs – an earlier strategic default generally reduces the present value
of the tax shield to a greater extent than a more remote bankruptcy. (In both cases, the
conclusion is opposite if equityholders’ bargaining power η is low.)
The effect of the growth option on the type of debt can be analyzed by comparing the
optimal choices in the basic case with those made when growth option is more in-the-money
(low I and high x0). For all but one combinations of parameter values, a more in-the-money
growth option is associated with a lower advantage (or a higher disadvantage) of renegotiable
debt. For example, a US$10 million cut in the investment cost to $39.98 million reduces the
benefit of renegotiable debt from 2.52% to 1.56% of the firm value. Finally, non-renegotiable
debt is generally optimal when cash flow volatility is low (σ = 0.1). This result can be




The paper provides a number of testable empirical implications. Implications 1-3 follow
from the results of the model obtained in Section 2, whereas implications 4 and 5 are based
on the numerical results of Section 3. In all of the hypotheses, debt renegotiability can be
proxied by the ratio of private debt and total debt (Asquith and Scharfstein (1994), and
Franks and Torous (1994)), the concentration of equityholders and creditors (Davydenko and
Strebulaev (2007)), and the inverse of the index of creditors’ power to enforce their claims
(Favara et al. (2009)). Moreover, the hypothesized empirical relationships are expected to
be stronger when equityholders’ bargaining power, η, is higher and the efficiency of creditors
as managers of the firm’s assets, ρ, is lower. Equityholders’ bargaining power can be proxied
by the fraction of equity held by the CEO (Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007)), the firm’s
asset size, and the inverse of the ratio of the R&D expenses to total assets (Garlappi et al.
(2008)). The value of the assets when held by creditors, captured by ρ, is assumed to increase
in asset tangibility and to decrease in the industry concentration (Garlappi et al. (2008)).
1) The coefficient of the interaction term of debt renegotiability with the debt overhang proxy
(cf. Hennessy et al. (2007)) is expected to have a negative sign in an investment regression.
The basic investment model based on q-theory can be extended for the effect of debt
financing by including a proxy for debt overhang (as in Hennessy et al. (2007)). This proxy
takes into account, among others, the leverage ratio, the expected recovery rate based on
the SIC code of the industry in which the firm operates as well as the estimate of the default
probability based on the debt rating (or the firm’s Z-score if the rating is not available). In
our model, debt renegotiability results ceteris paribus in an excessively delayed investment,
or more severe underinvestment. Therefore, it is expected that the firms that are financed
with renegotiable debt will have their coefficient of the debt overhang proxy lower (higher
in the absolute terms) than firms financed with non-renegotiable debt. As a consequence, in
a regression model run jointly for both types of firms, the coefficient of the interaction term
of debt renegotiability with the debt overhang proxy is expected to have a negative sign.
2) The positive effect of growth opportunities on the systematic risk of the firm’s equity will
be muted if the firm is financed with renegotiable debt.
Carlson et al. (2004) show that the presence of investment opportunities increases the
systematic risk of the firm’s equity as their beta is greater than that of the firm’s assets in
place. In the same way, the presence of default option reduces the systematic risk since the
possibility of exit acts as insurance against adverse cash flow shocks. Favara et al. (2009)
expand on the later point and show that the systematic risk of equity is lower if the expected
payoff to equityholders upon (strategic) default is greater. According to our model, debt
renegotiability will mitigate the positive effect of growth options as their exercise is expected
to be excessively delayed. Empirically, we expect the coefficient of the interaction term of
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the Tobin’s q and debt renegotiability to be negative in a regression model of the systematic
risk of equity.33
3) The presence of the renegotiation option combined with high shareholders’ bargaining
power is expected to reduce the sensitivity of investment to the firm’s cash flow.
In the framework applied in this paper, investment is triggered by a sufficiently high level
of cash flow from operations. This implies that a higher magnitude of Myers (1977) underin-
vestment makes investment less likely to be triggered by an incremental cash flow increase for
any initial cash flow level. As a consequence, the presence of the renegotiation option com-
bined with high shareholders’ bargaining power, which results in higher underinvestment, is
likely to reduce the sensitivity of investment to the firm’s cash flow. Therefore, the model
provides an alternative explanation of the empirical evidence that small and young firms (as
well as companies financed with public debt), exhibit relatively higher investment-cash flow
sensitivity (see Hubbard (1998), Boyle and Guthrie (2003), and Lyandres (2007)).34
4) An increase in the investment opportunity set of a firm generally leads to a bigger reduction
in the credit spread of its debt when renegotiation frictions are smaller.
The riskiness of debt reflected by its credit spread is highly influenced by the presence
of both an investment and a renegotiation option. Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) show
that allowing for the possibility of strategic debt service can significantly increase spreads,
as the effect of the anticipated concessions made to equityholders can dominate the benefits
of avoiding the bankruptcy costs. The results of our model paper imply that the presence of
investment opportunities leads to a bigger reduction in a credit spread of renegotiable debt,
unless equityholders’ bargaining power is exceptionally high (the effect of bargaining power
distribution is therefore expected to be non-monotonic, see Proposition 5) and the distance
to default is small.
5) The coefficient of the interaction term of debt renegotiability with Tobin’s q is expected to
have a negative sign in the leverage regression.
Finally, our model yields a testable prediction for the optimal capital structure decisions.
In Section 3 we obtain that the presence of the growth option reduces the optimal leverage
by a larger magnitude if debt is renegotiable. Therefore, for such debt the negative effect
of growth options on the optimal leverage (cf. Barclay et al. (2006)) will be exacerbated.
Empirically, we expect the coefficient of the interaction term of debt renegotiation with
Tobin’s q to have a negative sign in the leverage regression.
33To the extent that Tobin’s q can already reflect the anticipated additional delay in investment resulting
from renegotiable debt financing, one may want to instrument it by a (set of) variable(s) that are correlated
with the investment opportunity set and unrelated to the (perceived) efficiency of the firm’s investment
policy.
34Obviously, in our model cash flow is positively related to the value of the investment opportunity. Still,
as Tobin’s q is generally not a sufficient statistic for the former (as the relation between the two depends on
other characteristics of a firm), both variables can be meaningfully used in the investment regression.
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5. Conclusions
It is known that the investment policy of a firm is affected by its capital structure. The
presence of risky debt financing results in an inefficient delay in exercising corporate growth
options. We show that the possibility of debt renegotiation at the times of financial distress
exacerbates the underinvestment problem upon the firm’s expansion. This is a consequence
of the fact that the wealth transfer from equityholders to creditors which occurs upon invest-
ment is larger when the renegotiation option is present. The additional inefficiency in the
investment policy is more severe when equityholders have a stronger bargaining position and
the bankruptcy costs are high, and it can be eliminated by granting the entire bargaining
power to creditors. This result highlights the importance of the type of debt financing and
of the degree of enforcement of creditors’ rights on the way corporate investment decisions
are made.
Debt restructuring policy itself is affected by the presence of the growth option. In most
scenarios, the growth option reduces the probability of strategic default due to a higher
opportunity cost of doing so. However, the presence of the growth opportunity can accelerate
renegotiation if shareholders’ bargaining power is sufficiently high. In the opposite situation,
that is, when creditors hold substantial bargaining power, renegotiation occurs later. Finally,
the paper provides a number of empirical implications concerning the effect of the type of
debt on, among others, investment, equity systematic risk and the capital structure policy.
A. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. An arbitrary claim, F (x), contingent on x, and yielding
instantaneous cash flow Bx+C, where B,C ∈ R, satisfies the ordinary differential equation
(ODE)









Consequently, the value of the firm, Vi(x), its equity, Ei(x), debt, Di(x), and the value of
the firm in the hands of the creditors, Ri(x), all satisfy ODE (A.1). Constants B and C
are equal, respectively, to θi (1− τ) and bτ for the firm, to θi (1− τ) and −b (1− τ) for
the equity, to 0 and b for the debt, and to ρθi (1− τ) and 0 for the firm when run by the










Constants M1 and M2 are determined from boundary conditions specific to each claim.
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35After investment, M2 = 0 since there is no upper action trigger.
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where B1x
β2 is the value of the debt restructuring option. B1 and xr1 are obtained from the
following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:
θx (1− τ)
δ






























)−R1 (xr1))+ b (1− τ)r − θxr1 (1− τ)δ
]
x−β2r1 , (A.6)



























TSi (x) = 0, (A.9)
it holds that N2 = N3 = 0. The only remaining unknown constants are N1 and N4. Now, one
needs to consider two cases. If renegotiation is not allowed (k = 0), N1 = 0 as the tax shield




TSi (x) = lim
x↓xri





If renegotiation is allowed for (k = 1), there is no restriction on N1, and it is determined












36The smooth-pasting condition reflects the fact that renegotiation trigger xri is a reversible switch point
and does entail any optimization. Continuity of the first derivative of the value function at xri is then



















The optimal liquidation trigger can be found by applying the following value-matching and




































and subtracting it from (A.16) yields the implicit formula for xl1 . Obviously,
if debt restructuring has the form of bankruptcy, it is creditors who ultimately shut down
the firm.
Proof of Proposition 2. The value of the firm’s securities and the level of optimal
action triggers can be bound by solving ODE (A.1) for the firm and its equity subject to
the following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:
V0 (x) = V1 (x)− I, (A.17)









































Define matrix Θ(x, x) as











0 reflecting the growth opportunity and the liquidation
28












+ TS1 (x)− TS0 (x)− I + L1xβ2











The sum of both option values, G
(1)
v xβ1 + L
(1)
0 1x
β2 , can be expressed as




Λ(xr0 , x;x), (A.26)
where
Λ(x, x;x) ≡ E [e−rTx1{Tx<Tx}|x] = xβ1xβ2 − xβ1xβ2xβ1xβ2 − xβ1xβ2 , (A.27)
Λ(x, x;x) ≡ E [e−rTx1{Tx<Tx}|x] = xβ1xβ2 − xβ1xβ2xβ1xβ2 − xβ1xβ2 , (A.28)
and Ty is the stopping time at realization y of process (1). Consequently, Λ(x, x;x) (Λ(x, x;x))
is the present value of $1 received upon process x hitting upper barrier x (lower barrier x)
conditional on not hitting x (x) before and starting from level x (see Geman and Yor (1996)).
The expressions in square brackets in (A.26) are net payoffs associated with hitting the cor-
responding thresholds.
For k = 0, the value of the growth option is calculated using the fact that investment
opportunity is lost upon bankruptcy at x
(0)
r0 . Therefore, this value for x ≥ x(0)r0 can be
decomposed as G
(0)







= Θ(x, x(0)r0 )× (A.29)[
(θ−1)x(1−τ)
δ
+ TS1 (x)− TS0 (x)−BC1 (x) +BC0 (x)− I + L1xβ2
0
]
and (A.29) is obtained by solving value-matching condition (A.17) with an auxiliary value-
matching condition ensuring the continuity of the firm value at x
(0)
r0 . Now, the following
simplification can be made:
G(0)v x
β1 +G−v x







Constant L0(0) is calculated analogously as in (A.15) as there is no growth option after
bankruptcy.
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Finally, constants G and B0 reflecting the equityholders’ value of the growth and debt

















)−R0 (xr0)) ( xxr0 )β2 − xr0 (1−τ)δ + b(1−τ)r
 .
The implicit formulae for the optimal investment threshold, x, optimal debt restructuring
trigger, xr0 , and liquidation trigger, xl0 , are obtained by pairwise rearranging equations
(A.18)–(A.19), (A.20)–(A.21), and (A.22)–(A.23).
Proof of Proposition 3. Underinvestment occurs as long as B0 > B1, since in this
case the optimal investment threshold, x, is higher than a corresponding threshold of an






























(A.32) is obtained by combining (A.6) and (A.31). (A.33) is obtained from (A.6). Now,
define function B0 (·) so that the value of option to go bankrupt at an exogenously given trig-
ger y is B0 (y)x
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(θ − 1) ηρxr1
δ





37The option-like components of equity can also be expressed along the lines of (A.26).
38Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 are presented for γi = τ = 0, i ∈ {0, 1}. Extensive numerical simulations
in the parameter space {(δ, σ, r, η, ρ, I, τ, θ, γ0, γ1, b) ∈ R11|δ > 0, σ > 0, r > 0, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ρ < 1, I >
0, 0 ≤ τ < 1, θ > 1, γ0 > 0, γ1 > 0, b ≥ 0} indicate that the results of both propositions hold also for strictly
positive levels of the tax rate and liquidation values.
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Expression (A.35) is positive as all its components are positive. This implies that even the




xβ2 is higher than the value of the option
B1x
β2 . This implies that the value of the restructuring option B0x





xβ2 , exceeds B1x
β2 as well.
















θ − 1 . (A.36)
To evaluate the difference in investment thresholds, we proceed in the following steps. First,
we show that the difference B
(k)
0 −B(k)1 is larger for renegotiable debt (k = 1) if shareholders
can make take-it or leave-it offers (η = 1). Then, we use the fact that no difference occurs




i , i ∈ {0, 1},
for η = 0, cf. (A.6) and (A.31).) Finally, we show that B
(1)
0 −B(1)1 increases with bargaining
power parameter η.
























≡ K (ρkθix)β2 , (A.37)
With renegotiation, the relevant difference Bˆ
(1)
0 −B(1)1 equals K [ρ(1− θ)x]β2 , which is larger
than the analogous difference for non-renegotiable debt, K [(1− θ)x]β2 (β2 is negative).
Therefore, when the effect of the growth option is disregarded, the difference in the option
values to restructure debt for the original and the expanded firm is larger when debt is
renegotiable.
Now, observe that B
(0)
0 x
β2 , i.e., the option to go bankrupt, must be worth less than
(A.37) evaluated for k = i = 0, as the expansion option increases the opportunity cost of
bankruptcy (cf. (A.32)). In other words, B00x
β2 is always more out of the money (or less in
the money) than Bˆ
(0)
0 x
β2 . Therefore, B
(0)
0 −B(0)1 < Bˆ(0)0 −B(0)1 = Kxβ2
(
1− θβ2).
Now, we show that for η = 1, B
(1)
0 − B(1)1 > Bˆ(1)0 − B(1)1 = K (ρx)β2
(
1− θβ2). Again,
let function B0 (y)x
β2 be the value of the debt restructuring option exercised (possibly not

































































0 . In turn,




0 , as B
(1)
0 is a constant corresponding to the option with







fore, referring back to equation (6), the possibility of renegotiation occurring upon default
combined with equityholders making take-it or leave-it offers exacerbates underinvestment
compared to the situation where bankruptcy occurs upon default.
In fact, the proof of Proposition 4 is also straightforward for all η ≥ η∗, where η∗ is defined
as such a level of the equityholders’ bargaining power at which the equality η∗Gv = G is
satisfied. First, consider the value of the debt restructuring option that is (suboptimally)



















where G˜ and G˜v denote the constants corresponding to the equityholders’ and the firm’s







cannot be larger than B
(1)
0 since it is based on a suboptimal exercise








0 for η = η
∗, that is, when xr0 = θxr1 .) Therefore, it is







0 ). But this is immediate since ηG˜v − G˜ = 0 for η = η∗ and is increasing with η. To see
the latter point, notice that for any given expansion policy G˜v does not depend on η and G˜
is decreasing with η. Again, the latter is due to the fact that trigger θxr1 , upon which some
value of the equityholders’ growth option is lost, increases with η.
To prove Proposition 4 for η < η∗, observe the following. Constant B(1)0 of the debt
restructuring option can be represented as a(η)Bˆ
(1)




0 − B(1)1 increases with η it is sufficient to show the following: that a′(η) > 0 and
that ηGv − G increases with η. Starting from the latter, the argument is the same as in
the previous case: for a given expansion policy, Gv remains unchanged and G decreases
with η due to an increasing trigger xr0 . As the effect of the investment option on the
timing of the debt restructuring is reduced (ηGv−G is initially negative), trigger xr0 moves








0 , captured by the inverse of
a(η), decreases as well.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is straightforward and follows from equation (4).
Sice all the remaining factors in the second component of the RHS are positive, ηGv−G > 0
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Optimal Investment, Liquidation and Debt Restructuring Policies
Coupon Bargaining Creditors Volatility Return Interest Growth
Threshold rate power efficiency shortfall rate options
b η ρ σ δ r I−1, θ
x (i) (ii) (iii) + + +/−∗ −
x
(1)
r0 + + − − + − (iv)
x
(0)




+ + − − + + −
Table 1: Comparative statics concerning the optimal investment, x, renegotiation, x(1)r0 , bankruptcy, x
(0)
r0 ,
and liquidation, x(1)l0 , thresholds. ”+”, ”0”, and ”−” denote a positive, zero, and negative, respectively,
sensitivity with respect to the changes in a given parameter, and ”+/−” indicates an ambiguous sign of the
relationship. The numbers in brackets refer to the explanatory notes in the text. ∗/ In the basic investment
model, the investment threshold increase with r (when shortfall δ is held constant), see Dixit and Pindyck
(1994). With debt, higher r generally reduces the value of creditors’ claim, which can have an accelerating
effect on investment (in particular, for low r and σ).
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Valuation of Corporate Claims
Coupon Bargaining Creditors Volatility Return Interest Growth
Claim rate power efficiency shortfall rate options
b η ρ σ δ r I−1, θ
E0 − + − + − + +
D0 +− − + +/−∗ − +/−∗∗ (v)
V0 +− − + +/− − +/− +
Table 2: Comparative statics concerning the valuation of equity, E0, debt, D0, and the firm as a whole,
V0. ”+” (”−”) denotes a positive (negative) sensitivity with respect to a given parameter, and ”+−”
(”+/−”) indicates a humped (an ambiguous sign of the) relationship. The numbers in brackets refer to the
explanatory notes in the text. ∗/ The ”junk bond effect” (Leland (1994)) results in a positive relationship
between the debt value and cash flow volatility in the neighborhood of the endogenous debt restructuring
trigger. ∗∗/ The positive effect of a higher risk-neutral drift on the debt value can dominate for low r and σ.
37
Agency Cost of Debt and Debt Overhang
Coupon Bargaining Creditors Volatility Return Interest Growth
Cost rate power efficiency shortfall rate options
b η ρ σ δ r I−1, θ
AC(1) + + − − + − +
AC(0) + 0 − − + − +
AC(1)
AC(0)
≈ 0 + − − − + +/−∗
IDO + + − − + − +
Table 3: Comparative statics concerning the magnitude of the agency cost of renegotiable debt, AC(1),
non-renegotiable debt and AC(0), and of incremental debt overhang, IDO. ”+”, ”0” and ”−” denote a
positive, zero, and negative, respectively, sensitivity with respect to the changes in a given parameter. ∗/
The sign can be negative for x x∗ when the agency cost of underinvestment is more sensitive to I and θ
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Value of the firm, V0, its debt, D0, and equity, E0, before investment, with the shareholder’s
option to renegotiate the debt. xl0 is the optimal liquidation trigger, xr0 is the equityholders’ renegotiation
trigger, and x is the equity value-maximizing investment threshold.
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Figure 2: Optimal investment threshold as a function of coupon rate b, equityholders’ bargaining power η,
creditors’ efficiency ρ, and interest rate r. x(1,f) and x(1) denote the firm and the equity value-maximizing
threshold, respectively, in the presence of renegotiation option; x(0,f) and x(0) denote the firm and the equity
value-maximizing threshold, respectively, for non-renegotiable debt. x(e) is the all-equity firm investment
threshold.
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Figure 3: The agency cost of debt, AC(0) and AC(1), measured as the difference between the first-best
and second-best value of the firm in the absence and in the presence, respectively, of the renegotiation
option. Incremental debt overhang, IDO, measured as the value of the firm pursuing investment policy as
with non-renegotiable debt and financed with renegotiable debt minus the value of the firm financed with
renegotiable debt. AC(0), AC(1) and IDO are calculated for different values of the equityholders’ bargaining
power parameter η and varying levels of the cash flow process, x, for the basic set of parameter values (Panels
A and C) and for the negative growth-low volatility scenario, with δ = σ = 0.1 (Panels B and D).
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